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ABSTRACT: Zimbabwean historians have not yet fully assessed the interaction of
two problematic identities, ethnicity and nationalism, to determine whether the
two can work as partners and successfully co-exist. This essay argues that, in
Bulawayo during the period studied, ethnicity co-existed with and complemented
nationalism rather than the two working as polar opposite identities. Ethnic groups
provided both the required leaders who became prominent nationalist ﬁgures and
the precolonial history, personalities and monuments that sparked the nationalist
imagination. From the 1950s, ethnic groups expanded their horizons and provided
platforms from which emerging African nationalists launched their agenda.
Understanding these interrelationships will reshape our understanding of the
workings of these two identities in a cosmopolitan town.
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WITH associations and societies based on a plethora of identities, Bulawayo
provides an important case study for historians of urban ethnicity and
nationalism in Zimbabwe. Apart from being one of the ﬁrst colonial cities,
Bulawayo emerged as a rich mosaic of diﬀerent ethnic groups (Shona and
their subgroups, Ndebele, Kalanga, Venda, Sotho and others); its in-
habitants also came from diﬀerent countries including Northern Rhodesia,
Congo and Nyasaland and from varied social and cultural backgrounds.
Because of its multi-ethnic composition, combined with identities such as
trade unions, burial societies and sporting clubs, the city’s history illumi-
nates the way in which one of these prominent identities, ethnicity, related
with another rising identity of the mid-1950s, nationalism.
Economically, Bulawayo was a major employment centre, boasting the
headquarters of the Rhodesian Railways, plus numerous, small but viable,
gold mines that attracted labourers from beyond Southern Rhodesia.
Bulawayo was also a temporary stopover for Central African labourers trek-
king to the better-paid industries in South Africa, though some of them
never reached their intended destinations and settled permanently in
Bulawayo. Because of its industrial infrastructure, it attracted and raised a
generation of young men from diﬀerent ethnic groups, some of whom, in the
late 1940s and early 1950s, became prominent intellectuals in tertiary and
government institutions, important trade unionists and leaders of active
political associations, recreational organizations and pressure groups.
Among them were key ﬁgures in the ﬁrst signiﬁcant African nationalist pol-
itical party, the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (ANC),
which emerged in 1957.
This essay argues that, despite the town’s situation in an Ndebele area of
the country, there were more Shona political and civic leaders in the city than
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Ndebele and that by virtue of their exposure to the mixed character of the
city, key ﬁgures in ethnic associations were at the same time committed
cosmopolitans who mixed with others in their workplaces and in varied non-
ethnic platforms.
The period studied, 1950 to 1963, marks several important transitions
in Zimbabwean politics. Beginning in 1950 highlights the evolution of
African social and political thought both before the short-lived Federation
of Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland (established in 1953)
and thereafter. The year 1963 is an appropriate cut-oﬀ for two reasons.
First, politically it is a transitional period in white politics, marking the
shift from the United Federal Party to the Rhodesian Front, which won
elections in 1962, a year before the demise of the Federation. Second, for
Africans, the ﬁrst and most signiﬁcant split in nationalist leadership
occurred in 1963 with the formation of the Zimbabwe African National
Union (ZANU), a breakaway group from the Zimbabwe African Peoples’
Union (ZAPU). The period also saw an increased African permanency in
town along with a commensurate increase in African participation in urban
politics through ethnic associations, Advisory Boards and the nationalist
movement.
The relationship between ethnicity and nationalism is not straightforward.
It is problematic in part because of the popular, but erroneous, perception
that these identities are either polar opposites or successors to each other.
The notion that ethnicity was inimical to nationalism was shared by most
African nationalist elites of the 1960s and by those of the present, both of
whom have condemned it as an outmoded and parochial attachment to tribe
that ought to have been swept away with the rise of African nationalism.
Writing in praise of urban nationalism, Ndabaningi Sithole, once co-leader
of ZAPU and later ﬁrst ZANU president, summarizes this belief succinctly:
‘African tribalism was on the way out as a result of the onslaught of
industrialism, and the writing on the wall read, ‘‘From tribalism – what’s
next? Of course, African nationalism’’ ’.1 Lampooning ‘tribalism’ as a pre-
colonial relic, Sithole argued:
fundamentally, the tribal concept arose out of a common need of a group of
people who had a common goal. Since this common need was no longer there, and
since a new era of common interests had been created by the colonization of Africa,
a new common goal was formulated and nationalism was the expression of that
goal.2
Sithole’s argument summarizes a dominant political school in Zimbabwe
today which casts most ethnic expression as a form of tribalism that retards
nationalism.
This paper will argue that the naı¨vete´ of this assumption arises from a
failure to distinguish ethnicity from tribalism. Whereas (political) tribalism
is normally the mobilization of ethnically conscious people to ferment
political enmity and disunity between ethnic ‘others’ to the detriment of
nationalism, ethnicity, its variant, is that capacity in people to classify
themselves as social ‘others’. In deﬁning itself, an ethnic community is more
1 Ndabaningi Sithole, African Nationalism (2nd ed., London, 1968), 98.
2 Ibid. 98.
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inward-looking than a political tribe.3 Ethnic groups do not exist primarily
as political institutions to ﬁght oﬀ their opponents, but to preserve their
cultural artefacts, their traditions and that which they imagine as the stuﬀ
from which their group is made. In this endeavour, ethnic groups do not
always stand as opponents to the development of a nation, but instead may
complement eﬀorts at developing an inclusive nation. This analysis of the
way that ethnicity and nationalism have fed into each other over a period of
time is the central concern of this paper. I will argue that in Zimbabwe
during this period, ethnicity was not essentially pitted against nationalism.
The case study of Bulawayo will show that ethnicity provided precolonial
heroes for nationalists, platforms for political mobilization, and monuments
that nationalists were able to turn into national symbols. Moreover, ethnic
groups and related associations provided local expressions of anti-colonial
discontent. Thus, during this period, ethnicity co-existed with and worked
to the beneﬁt of nationalism.
Despite the importance of both ethnicity and nationalism, current
Zimbabwean historiography has been relatively silent in its analysis of their
relationship. Most scholars who wrote after Zimbabwe’s independence
limited their analysis of nationalism to the war of liberation (1966 to 1979).
Their focus on the contradictions between nationalist parties and person-
alities,4 the rape of women under the shadow of war,5 the appeal to African
religion for mass mobilization,6 the role of the church in the liberation war,7
and the nationalists’ methods of mass mobilization and recruitment8 all
produced a critical review of wartime politics, but not necessarily a more
illuminating understanding of nationalism itself.9 Moreover, most of these
works were on Mashonaland and Midlands, which left Matabeleland
untouched. This focus on the war came at the expense of analysing the social
history of nationalism before the war, and has led indirectly to the belief that
nationalism was synonymous with the violent liberation struggle. In fact,
nationalism was not the ﬁght for independence but rather the ideology,
the rationale and the spirit behind those political movements against col-
onialism. The ﬁght for independence was, in part, simply a manifestation of
nationalism.
Recent work has transcended some of these limitations by focusing on the
development of nationalism in speciﬁc areas of Zimbabwe. Terence Ranger
3 E. Msindo, ‘Ethnicity in Matabeleland, Zimbabwe: A study of Kalanga–Ndebele
relations, 1960s–1980s’ (Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 2004), 5.
4 Masipula Sithole, Zimbabwe: Struggles within the Struggle (2nd ed., Harare, 1999).
5 Josephine Nhongo-Simbanegavi, For Better or For Worse? Women and ZANLA in
Zimbabwe’s Liberation War (Harare, 2000), 119–24.
6 David Lan, Guns and Rain: Guerrillas and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe (Harare,
1985).
7 Ian Linden, The Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe (London, 1980);
N. Bhebe, The ZAPU and ZANU: Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran
Church in Zimbabwe (Gweru, 1999).
8 T. O. Ranger, Peasant Consciousness and the Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe: A
Comparative Study (Berkeley, 1985); Norma J. Kriger, Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla War:
Peasant Voices (Cambridge, 1992).
9 Msindo, ‘Ethnicity in Matabeleland’, ch. 1, does a thorough review of works on this
period.
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has tried to bring in aspects of the history of rural nationalism in
Matabeleland by demonstrating the importance of Mwali worship in the
emergence, legitimation and mobilization of nationalist sentiment in the
Matopos.10 Jocelyn Alexander, JoAnn McGregor and Terence Ranger did a
similar analysis of the Shangani in which they unveiled the conﬂict between
evictees from Filabusi and the Shangani originals.11 The former made up the
bulk of the ‘proto-nationalists ’ of the African National Voice Association
who were bitter about their eviction from Filabusi.12 By that time, these
authors argued, the Matabeleland Home Society (MHS), which had a nar-
rower ethnic and regional vision than the more ‘populist ’ body, the ‘Voice’,
had ‘faded away’ and its leader Siphambaniso Manyoba died in 1952.13
Whilst it could be true of the Shangani that ethnic associations were losing
importance to more broad-based organizations,14 it is not true of Bulawayo
where such associations were strong and co-existed with and complemented
nationalism. These scholars are, however, correct in their assertion that the
‘Voice’ instilled in the Shangani people some key nationalist ideas and pro-
vided leaders who later joined the nationalist movements of the late 1950s,15
in a situation parallel to that in Bulawayo.
Alexander and others also brieﬂy trace how the Shangani people, evictees
and originals, made places like Pupu appeal to both the Ndebele and non-
Ndebele by celebrating the last Lobengula – British South Africa Company
battle and at the same time accepting its sacredness as the shrine of the
original inhabitants (Tonga, Rozvi and Shangwe), who were mainly non-
Ndebele. Pupu became an area where ‘diﬀerences of ethnicity and ideology
could be synthesised’.16 This is an important point, but nonetheless these
authors fail to trace the speciﬁc ways in which ethnicity co-existed with and
complemented nationalism in this region.
A COSMOPOLITAN CITY : CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND UNIONS
IN BULAWAYO TO 1950
In the period before 1950, the numerous non-ethnic associations in
Bulawayo lacked a coherent focus. Although some of these organizations
championed African causes, they were not well organized in their articu-
lation of these problems and had neither eﬀective leadership nor a nationalist
ideology that might have helped to overcome the forces that divided
them. Nonetheless, these organizations prepared the groundwork for later
territory-wide nationalist movements in that they inculcated a widespread
culture of activism in the African community.
10 T. Ranger and M. Ncube, ‘Religion in the Guerrilla War: the case of Southern
Matabeleland’, in N. Bhebe and T. Ranger (eds.), Society in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War,
vol. II (London, 1995), 35–57; T. Ranger, Voices From the Rocks: Nature, Culture and
History in the Matopos Hills of Zimbabwe (Oxford, 1999), 209.
11 J. Alexander, J. McGregor and T. Ranger, Violence and Memory: One Hundred
Years in the ‘Dark Forests ’ of Matabeleland (Oxford, 2000), 110–11, 170.
12 Ibid. 95–8. 13 Ibid. 90–1.
14 An argument similar to that of the nationalist Ndabaningi Sithole in the 1960s
(quoted before) that nationalism beneﬁted from the erosion of ethnic associations, a
generalization which I strongly dispute.
15 Alexander et al., Violence and Memory, 98. 16 Ibid. 108–9.
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Inclusive organizations such as trade unions were undoubtedly important,
especially from the 1920s. By 1929, the Industrial and Commercial Workers’
Union (ICU) under Charles Mzingeli, Masotsha Ndlovu and Job
Dumbutshena had already popularized itself in both urban and rural
Matabeleland, especially in the mining areas. The ICU was not exclusively
an urban labour movement speaking against poor housing, low wages and
poor working conditions;17 it also delved into many non-labour-related and
rural matters such as land shortage, racial discrimination, the violence of
native commissioners and other issues.18 This duality may have responded to
the needs of contemporary urban Africans, still steeped in both rural agrarian
and urban industrial worlds. It also reﬂected colonial law that deﬁned urban
space as exclusively European.19
Suspicious of its activities, the government closely monitored the ICU,
intimidating its leaders and labelling them communists; moreover, the
government formed a parallel structure to express ‘African’ opinion: the
Native Welfare Societies. This all limited the ICU’s appeal until it collapsed
in the mid-1930s.20 From the 1940s, however, the situation was changing.
Africans were becoming more permanent urban residents21 and trade
unionism had a resurgence. From the mid- to the late 1940s, the ICU, under
Mzingeli tried to revive itself into a single Reformed ICU, mainly based in
Salisbury. It co-existed with two new organizations, the Federation of
Bulawayo African Trade Unions under Jasper Savanhu and the British
African Workers Voice Association22 which, under the leadership of
Benjamin Burombo, organized the 1948 strikes.23 While this strike action
revealed the high level of worker frustration in the absence of a united
leadership, its goals were mainly limited to the demand for higher wages and
fairer dispute resolution between employee and employer, and it did not
reﬂect a high level of union organization.24
These early ethnically diverse organizations accomplished little because of
their general ineptness, power-hungry leadership, diverse class interests and
personality diﬀerences.25 There was also little logistical support from the
Union of South Africa, from which the idea of trade unionism had been
imported.26 However, such organizations helped to promote broader urban
17 Charles van Onselen, Chibaro: African Mine Labour in Southern Rhodesia,
1900–1933 (Johannesburg, 1976), 210–14.
18 Lawrence Vambe, From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe (London, 1976), 53, 96.
19 Bulawayo Reference Library (Byo Ref. Lib.), 33/2, City of Bulawayo, Urban Aﬀairs
Commission: Answers to questions, Sept. 1957.
20 Van Onselen, Chibaro, 214–15; Vambe, Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, 97–9.
21 Byo Ref. Lib., J. Z. Sawanhu, ‘The suggested native urban policy of Southern
Rhodesia: an African viewpoint ’, Bulawayo, May 1945 (uncatalogued).
22 Vambe, Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, 272.
23 Jon Lunn, ‘The meaning of the 1948 General Strike in colonial Zimbabwe’, in
B. Raftopoulos and T. Yoshikuni (eds.), Sites of Struggle: Essays in Zimbabwe’s Urban
History (Harare, 1999), 163–82.
24 Ian Phimister, An Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe, 1890–1948: Capital
Accumulation and Class Struggle (London, 1988), 270–3.
25 Phimister, An Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe, 264–74.
26 The ICU started in South Africa under Clement Kadalie, a Nyasalander. He sent
Robert Sambo to start a branch in Southern Rhodesia, but he was soon deported back
south; thereafter, local leaders under Mzingeli took over. See Ian Phimister and Charles
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identities. Nationalist writer Lawrence Vambe credited these trade unions
with breaking down ethnic loyalties: they ‘assailed, as no black person had
done before, all forms of tribalism and those at the head of burial societies
and other tribal groupings’.27 He viewed these early trade unionists
(Dumbutshena, Mzingeli and Masotsha Ndlovu) as epitomizing national-
ism. They ‘stand out as key ﬁgures in laying the foundation of modern
African nationalism in Zimbabwe’; their ICU was ‘a militant organization
embracing all the characteristics of a truly nationalist movement, trans-
cending tribal diﬀerences, and supplanting them with the concept of
a common African crusade against white economic, political and racial
supremacy. This approach was new and unique’.28
Vambe’s defence of fallen heroes must be appreciated, especially since
his book was produced when nationalism faced a leadership crisis. In the
mid-1970s, most African leaders were divided, ideologically confused and
power-hungry. In this collective disillusionment, intellectuals such as
Vambe, feeling betrayed by contemporary nationalists, overstated the con-
tribution of the ICU. In fact, by the mid-1950s, the popularity of the
Reformed ICU under Mzingeli had greatly declined. He was not able to
link the grievances of urban workers with their family problems in the
rural areas. In opposition to him rose the City Youth League in Salisbury,
which in 1957 combined with the old ANC based mainly in Bulawayo to
form the Southern Rhodesia ANC.29 Unlike their predecessors, the political
organizations of the late 1950s were less concerned with wages and employ-
ment than with the political project of constructing a nation. Zimbabwean
nationalism was not therefore strictly a brainchild of trade unionists, as
Vambe alleges, though it beneﬁted from the contributions of some leaders of
trade unions – such as Joshua Nkomo (from the Railways African Workers’
Union), Jason Moyo (from the Artisans Union) and Francis Nehwati
(Municipal Workers’ Union) – and though, at times, the new ANC operated
from the oﬃces of the Southern Rhodesia Trade Union Congress (SRTUC)
led by Nkomo.30
Bulawayo also had many burial societies. Some of them served the in-
terests of existing ethnic groups (e.g. the Manyika Burial Society or the
Malubale Burial Society); some mirrored regional identities in formation,
such as the Mashonaland United Burial Society or even smaller units like
the district of origin, such as the Mhondoro Reserve Burial Society and
the Dotito Mount Darwin Burial Society. Others expressed territorial and
geographical loyalties, such as the Nyasaland Burial Society. Still others,
like the Young Fort Victoria Burial Society, were both regional and gener-
ational.
There were also sporting and recreational clubs. They ranged from those
drawing membership from an ethnic constituency (the Manyika Boxing
Club that existed from as early as the 1920s),31 to others with a multi-ethnic
van Onselen, ‘The labour movement in Zimbabwe, 1900–1945’, in B. Raftopoulos
and I. Phimister, Keep On Knocking: A History of the Labour Movement in Zimbabwe,
1900–1997 (Harare, 1991). 27 Vambe, Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, 96. 28 Ibid. 101.
29 Raftopoulos and Phimister, Keep On Knocking, 75–6. 30 Ibid. 76.
31 E. Msindo, ‘Ethnicity, not class? The 1929 Bulawayo faction ﬁghts reconsidered’,
Journal of Southern African Studies, 32 (2006), 429–47.
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image, despite struggles for leadership positions that mirrored ethnic
loyalties. To this group belonged the Bulawayo Football Association, often
controlled by Shona people, with a few Ndebele in the upper ranks.32 Other
organizations, however, were truly non-ethnic, including the African
Ballroom Dancing Club and the Rhodesian Dancing Clubs.33
As for so-called ‘Alien’ Africans (those from other countries), they were
not particularly united, but were beginning to be organized in the late 1940s.
Because of rising anti-colonial protests in their original countries, they were
beginning to form strong diasporic ‘nationalistic ’ groups whose meetings
and public views were often articulated in the African press. By 1955, the
Nyasaland ANC was listed as one of the nine most robust associations in
Bulawayo.34 Evidence shows that aspiring Zimbabwean nationalists usually
attended Nyasaland ANCmeetings as both speakers and delegates before the
formation of the new Southern Rhodesian ANC.35 Foreigners were also
organized through other groups, including the Northern Rhodesian Chiefs
Association, the Barotse Association, NyasalandCommunity representatives,
and the Club dos Indegenas da Republic Portuguesa, which comprised
leaders of various ethnic and communal groups from outside the territory
who tried to maintain contacts with their original homes. These leaders
helped to settle disputes between their members, resolve family quarrels and
enforce ‘tribal ’ custom amongst their members. They also met government
representatives from their countries when they visited Bulawayo and acted as
spokespersons before the Southern Rhodesian authorities.36
Notwithstanding the proliferation of associations, some of which were
non-ethnic such as the dancing clubs, sporting associations, territorial or-
ganizations, trade unions and others mentioned above, ethnic associations
were also on the increase in Bulawayo. Before 1950, the most common
groups were the Matabeleland Home Society (MHS), the Kalanga Cultural
Society (KCS) formed in 1946 and the Manyika Society. In the 1950s, they
were increasing rapidly in number and becoming more organized, perhaps
because of advancing African urbanization.
CONCEPTUALIZING NATIONALISM IN THE EARLY AND MID-1950S37
Southern Rhodesians of the early 1950s might not have deﬁned themselves as
nationalists, nor had they imagined a named nation and its social boundaries.
32 Delegate Stanley Hall, ‘Mr. Msarurgwa should be chairman of Mashonaland’,
African Home News (hereafter in notes AHN ), 22 Dec. 1956; AHN, 30 Jan. 1960;
Editorial, ‘Tribalism in Bulawayo’, AHN, 7 Oct. 1961.
33 Bulawayo City Council (BCC), T. Box 135, A1, Tribal associations in Bulawayo,
2 Feb. 1955. 34 Ibid.
35 BCC, T. Box 100, S.0.8, African associations and societies : A report of the meeting
held in the Stanley Hall by the Nyasaland African Congress on the 20th of Jan. 1957, by
Thomas Murefu, Native Constable.
36 BCC, 33/2, Urban Aﬀairs Commission: Answers to questions, Sept. 1957; BCC,
T. Box 100, S.0.8, N. Rhodesia Government Labour Oﬃce to the Director of Native
Administration, Bulawayo, 29Nov. 1955; Nkonjera, ‘Nyasalanders in Southern Rhodesia
told to care for families home’, Bantu Mirror (hereafter in notes BM ), 24 June 1950.
37 The period covers the early days of the campaigns for Federation, and its inception,
until the rise of the ANC under Nkomo.
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They were not technically Zimbabweans. They had many identities that at
times fed into each other, including those based on ethnicity, region, gender
and trade union membership. In town, the colonial economy further divided
Africans by class. In the early 1950s there was a growing middle class
composed of highly qualiﬁed teachers, clerks and football referees, social
workers, artisans/cabinet makers and shop owners. Some of them, especially
Advisory Board members, were closely monitored by the colonial admini-
stration.38 Although members of the middle class were better paid than other
Africans, they also had complaints, particularly lower pay than white work-
mates. In addition, some African graduates were underemployed, and at
times supervised by untrained white personnel.39
Perhaps most importantly, black urban elites lacked political power, which
made them identify more with the poor African masses than with their
rulers. Because their intellectual position and experiences aﬀorded them
a more privileged and more informed interpretation of current political
aﬀairs, they became an African ‘think tank’, publicizing their views in the
African-edited newspapers. Political debates in these publications, the
Bantu Mirror and the African Home News, showed an intelligent grasp of
colonial problems, which was important to emerging nationalist ideology.40
Even the Chief Native Commissioner (CNC), though doubtful that Africans
would mature from their ‘adherence to tribal custom’, admitted that by 1956
there was ‘a growing nationalism among Africans’.41
By the mid-1950s, Africans had a broader understanding of racial segre-
gation, thanks to expanded Western education, the African press and infor-
mal political forums at beer drinking sessions. This popular understanding
of colonial injustices cemented the concept of ‘blackness’, creating the
notion of ‘the African’ as an oppressed ‘other’ who had to move beyond the
limits of ethnic loyalties to ﬁght a collective cause.42 Since colonial injustices
were racially motivated, it is not surprising that African nationalism became,
to some degree, racially construed. According to Ndabaningi Sithole, African
nationalism was ‘a political feeling seeking relentlessly to eliminate eurocracy
by supplanting it with afrocracy… an eﬀective instrument of establishing
African rule’.43
Racially construed black nationalism invited its own opponent, white
nationalism, an alternative oﬃcial nationalism of the Rhodesian Front,
which I would call ‘Rhodesianism’. Radical Rhodesians like Cliﬀ Pocket
saw African nationalism as an illegitimate movement seeking a violent
‘total surrender of one race to another’ instead of respecting the status
quo.44 Moderate Rhodesians of the United Federal Party believed in racial
38 BCC, A3.3, Members – General : Bulawayo African Advisory Board, Oct. 1951.
39 Joshua Nkomo, Nkomo: The Story of My Life (London, 1984), 41–3.
40 BM, 14 Jan. 1950, 7; BM, 29 Mar. 1952; BM, 26 July 1952, 1; BM, 9 Oct. 1954, 2;
BM, 15 Jan. 1955. 41 CNC’s Annual Report in BM, 14 Apr. 1956.
42 M. Crawford Young, ‘Revisiting nationalism and ethnicity in Africa’ (James S.
Coleman Memorial Lecture Series, University of California, Los Angeles, 2004), 1–17
(unpublished).
43 Sithole, African Nationalism (London, 1968), 57.
44 Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London (ICS), DT 969 GRE, Stella
Greenway, Cliﬀ Pocket and Revd. Ndabaningi Sithole, ‘Nation Building ’ (Salisbury,
Capricorn Society, 1962), 9–13.
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partnership, an undeﬁned phenomenon which was thought to mean that all
inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia were identiﬁed primarily as ‘Rhodesians’,
retaining their racial identities and the positive aspects of their cultures and
adopting English as the oﬃcial language of the Rhodesian nation.45 To many
Africans, however, this quasi-racial partnership was meaningless and would
not change the political situation. Its major supporters, the United Federal
Party and the non-racial forum the Capricorn Society, collapsed with the
dissolution of the Federation in 1963.
Nationalist ideas were also generated from African participation in inter-
national politics. In the early 1940s, some Africans fought against Germany
on the side of the Allied powers in the Second World War. The bloody
wartime killings of Europeans by other Europeans exposed to them the
barbaric side of their supposed superiors, further eroding the myth of ‘white
superiority’. A decade later, Nkomo and Savanhu travelled to England
for the Federation talks.46 For the ﬁrst time, they engaged in international
discussions about the future of their country. The publicity surrounding
these talks contributed to Nkomo’s developing reputation as one of the most
important budding nationalist leaders.
At home in the early 1950s, anti-Federation talks were creating a broad
African political consensus, though there was not yet a viable political
party. African leaders in Bulawayo tried to unite major social and political
organizations into a Convention, but, despite signiﬁcant popular oppo-
sition to the federal project, they were unsuccessful because of personality
diﬀerences. Nkomo and others urged fellow Africans to boycott beer halls
as a protest against the proposed Federation of the two Rhodesias and
Nyasaland, believing that Federation would discourage the rise of national-
ism.47 They also suspected that the Federation would harden colonial
control by entrenching white rule, countering the spirit of decoloniz-
ation that was developing across Africa. They also feared that this proposal
was being imposed against the wishes of the Africans and that it would
erode the little authority that ethnically based leaders exercised over their
people.48
African opponents of Federation were justiﬁed in their fears. Roy
Welensky, the premier of the Federation, admitted that its major political
objective was to halt emergent African nationalism. Federation existed ‘to
inject stability into Central Africa and to contain this disruptive movement’,
those ‘forces of African racialism [which] were on the move’.49 By
45 Rhodes University, Cory Library (Cory), 968 (91) NAT, Report of the National
Convention of Southern Rhodesia, Salisbury (Rhodesian printers, 31 Oct. to 5 Nov.
1960), 34.
46 Federation brought S. Rhodesia, N. Rhodesia and Nyasaland into a political, social
and economic partnership, pulling their resources together and under one Federal
Government but still having their own national parliaments. It existed from 1953 to 1963.
47 BM, 3 Jan. 1953; BM, 14 Mar. 1953.
48 Byo Ref. Lib. (uncatalogued), K. Kirkwood, The Proposed Federation of the Central
African Territories (Johannesburg, 1952), 5, 14–15; Roy Welensky, ‘The Federation and
the Commonwealth’, Address at Albert Hall, London to the Directors of the United
Kingdom, 8 Nov. 1961, 7–8.
49 Byo Ref. Lib. (uncatalogued), Welensky, ‘The Federation and the Common-
wealth’, 3.
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entrenching European power and turning a blind eye to African political
aspirations, the architects of the Federation were underscoring racial
divisions in the country. Such attitudes, in combination with new racially
biased legislation, helped to increase the gap between black and white, a gap
that played to the advantage of nationalism.
Another notable feature of the 1950s was the increasing importance of the
precolonial era in popular memory. By appealing to precolonial traditions,
modern African nationalism obtained its much-needed legitimacy. With the
increase in ethnically based cultural societies in the 1950s, mostly responding
to cultural decay in Bulawayo, Africans sought to discover their roots.
Ethnic associations such as the MHS, the Sons of Mashonaland Cultural
Society (MCS), the KCS, and many ‘Alien’50 societies appointed respectable
elders from their rural areas as oﬃcial ‘tribal’ historians. Most of these
‘historians’, having lived through and witnessed the last years of their pre-
colonial states, and some having fought against colonization in the 1890s,
became eminent heroes for the urbanized dwellers who sought to re-
traditionalize themselves. The MHS, for instance, used Ginyilitshe
Hlabangana, an old Ndebele imbongi (poet) who had served under
the Ndebele King Lobengula. As a respected elder, he played a part in the
attempt of the MHS to regionalize Ndebele identity from the mid-1940s.
He also helped revive the notion of King Mzilikazi and Lobengula as
Ndebele heroes. He became the oﬃcial MHS adviser, gracing major Ndebele
events.51 Showing their respect to precolonial culture, nationalists made
frequent visits to the graves of Mzilikazi in the Matopos and that of the
heroine Lozikeyi (Lobengula’s senior wife) in Nkosikazi, Matabeleland, in
the late 1950s. Nationalists believed that by frequenting the graves of these
local heroes and heroines, they would receive new energy and courage to
ﬁght colonialism. By the late 1950s, these graves had been transformed from
artefacts for Ndebele ethnicity into popular national monuments.
ETHNICITY AND NATIONALISM IN INFORMAL ASSOCIATIONS AND
SOCIETIES , 1950–1963
During this period of emerging nationalism in Bulawayo, ethnicity and
nationalism co-existed, sometimes as complementary identities. Whilst
members of ethnic groups valued these identities, they were not necessarily
inimical to nationalism. When nationalists denounced ‘tribalism’, they did
not advocate the abolition of ethnic societies. Some nationalists even retained
their membership of such associations. Indeed, for some ethnic groups,
identifying with nationalism helped to enhance their pride and increase their
popular legitimacy and recognition. Nonetheless, architects of nationalism
were also able to take advantage of the divisions between ethnic groups to
assert a broader, overarching Zimbabwean identity.
The history of Bulawayo’s three main ethnic associations – the MHS,
MCS and KCS – clearly demonstrates the ways that advocates of national-
ism drew from the language, culture and reinterpreted histories of the
country’s largest ethnic groups. The MHS, founded around 1923 or
50 ‘Alien’ is a term used in the colonial setting to describe African foreigners.
51 BM, 12 July 1958; BM, 9 Aug. 1958.
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earlier,52 championed the cause of the Ndebele as an ethnic group. It existed
to secure ‘mutual understanding and unity of action among the Matabele
people’ ; to foster Ndebele comradeship; ‘ to exhort, guide and lead the
Matabele people in the ways of purity, peaceful advancement, good and right
living in their homes, in urban and rural areas’ ; and ‘to assist the Matabele
people in representing them to the Government in all matters concerning
them and their welfare in urban and rural areas’.53During the 1940s, the group
was concerned with a number of key cultural issues, particularly lobbying
for a royal Induna Enkulu (paramount chief), encouraging pilgrimages to
Entumbane (the burial place of Mzilikazi)54 and fostering debate about the
morality of Ndebele women.55 By the late 1940s and early 1950s, in response
to a sharp drop in membership56 caused by poor ﬁnancial accountability57 and
its pro-royalist leanings, the MHS tried to increase membership by redeﬁn-
ing ‘Ndebele’ as a regional identity and initiating debates on de-stocking and
the Land Husbandry Act, which aﬀected all people in Matabeleland (and
indeed all of Southern Rhodesia), both urban and rural, regardless of ethnic
aﬃliation. For the ﬁrst time, being Ndebele became synonymous with
‘belonging to Matabeleland’, a more democratized, regionalized identity,
that included Kalanga, Venda, Tonga and other ethnic groups from the re-
gion. Ndebele history also got a new interpretation, with Ndebele kings
(Mzilikazi and Lobengula) idolized, and tales of their precolonial violence
banished from the new Ndebele oral traditions. For the ﬁrst time, the two
were portrayed as nationalists who ‘stood against tribal purity’.58 In the in-
terests of Ndebele regionalism, Kalanga became ‘Mandebeles by ‘‘national-
ization’’ and they should not claim a separate language from that spoken by
Amandebele’.59 Nationalist historians further codiﬁed this gloriﬁcation of
precolonial heroes.60 With the forming of the ﬁrst African nationalist party,
the ANC, Ndebele became the oﬃcial language of nationalism in Bulawayo.
52 In their constitution, they claim that it was formed in 1921; other documents suggest
that it was in 1923. See BCC, T. Box 100, S.0.8, Matabeleland Home Society,
Constitution.
53 National Archives, Zimbabwe (NAZ), Harare, S2584/4251, Constitution of the
Matabele Home Society.
54 NAZ, Harare, S2584/4251, MHS: Chairman’s Report, 15 Dec. 1945; NAZ,
S2584/4251, Secretary, MHS to the Secretary, National Monuments Commission,
Bulawayo, 8 Apr. 1945.
55 The debate about the morality of women was an old one originating from around
1915, as I demonstrated elsewhere. See Msindo, ‘Ethnicity, not class?’
56 AHN, 25 Sept. 1954.
57 BCC, T. Box 100, S.0.8, Location Superintendent to the Director of African
Administration, Bulawayo, 19 Sept. 1952. The Superintendent reported that there was
‘no proper system of bookkeeping at all and there is no regards of receipts issued of the
payments by the members of the Society’.
58 James Khumalo, ‘Lobengula stood against tribal purity in Matabeleland’, BM, 2
Dec. 1961 (emphasis added). For a similar view held by Luza, that Kalanga are Ndebele,
see AHN, 12 Jan. 1957.
59 BM, 2 Dec. 1961. See also SamMazingabo, ‘Does not want Kalanga in the Mirror’,
BM, 5 Mar. 1960; Mr. K. Ngubane, ‘Ndebele speakers must announce on loud
speakers’, BM, 5 Feb. 1960.
60 T. O. Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, 1896–7: A Study of African Resistance
(London, 1967).
ETHNICITY AND NATIONALISM IN URBAN COLONIAL ZIMBABWE277
Apart from broadening Ndebele identity, long-serving associations such
as the MHS were readily available platforms, usually hijacked by early
nationalists who, in the absence of an eﬀective political party, took advantage
of their membership in such groups to discuss political ideas. At one
MHS meeting in 1955, Joshua Nkomo and Peter Kumalo, though fearing
the presence of colonial spies, found a ready audience before whom they
made strong remarks about the unfair annexation of the country by the
Europeans.61 Nkomo used the MHSmeetings to stress his arguments against
the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland,62 resulting in his election to
represent Africans at the Federation talks in London.63 Common urban
problems and harsh colonial legislation such as the Land Husbandry Act
were also discussed at MHS meetings.64 Because of the increasing signiﬁ-
cance of ethnically based societies in debating broader issues in the 1950s, the
Chief Native Commissioner’s 1956 report alluded to ‘a growing nationalism
among Africans’.65 Before 1957, however, Africans were still divided into
many associations, with leaders sometimes clashing over personality diﬀer-
ences that left them unable to unite.66 The ﬁrst broad nationalist party, the
ANC, only emerged in 1957.
Urban nationalism also beneﬁted from the internal divisions within vari-
ous ethnic groups. Since such divisions weakened these organizations, there
was less likelihood of regional ethnic blocks turning into dominant political
‘tribes’ with the power to subvert nationalism. Although the regional in-
itiative of the MHS was created to beneﬁt Ndebele by subjecting weaker
ethnic groups to a public Ndebele image and culture, this regionalized
identity-in-formation had its own challenges. It annoyed the Ndebele roy-
alty. Members of the royal family thought that by broadening its agenda, the
MHS vulgarized Ndebele identity and misrepresented their aﬀairs. They
later split and formed their own Sons of Mzilikazi Home Society, which
often clashed with the MHS on interpretations of Ndebele culture.67 There
was also a rise in Kalanga ethnic activism in Bulawayo, which sought
urban social space and to free its advocates from a domineering Ndebele
public image.68 Kalanga resurgence in the 1950s and early 1960s depleted
MHS membership in Bulawayo,69 further weakening possible Ndebele
regionalism, to the beneﬁt of nationalism. Particularly undermining a
regional Ndebele identity were Kalanga attempts to reconstruct history by
61 BCC, T. Box 100, S.0.8, Location Superintendent to the Director of African
Administration, Bulawayo, 5 Sept. 1955. 62 BM, 4 Oct. 1952. 63 BM, 3 Jan. 1954.
64 BM, 25 Sept.1954, see article, ‘Matabeleland Home Society encourages Africans to
buy stands’, 1. 65 BM, 14 Apr. 1956.
66 AHN, 3 June 1954; BM, 20 Apr. 1957; BM, 27 Apr. 1957 (see title, ‘Unity in city
looks gloomy’, 1).
67 There was a clash over the visit of Rose Kumalo, a female, to the king’s grave – BM,
2 Aug. 1958; BM, 9 Aug. 1958 with a heading, ‘Matebele Society washing dirty linen in
public’, by Pure Bloodied Ndebele. See also BCC, T. Box 101, S.0.8, Societies and
constitutions, vol. II : Mzilikazi Family Association – Bulawayo, Constitution.
68 Umndebele Uqobo, ‘Letter to the Editor, Mr. J. Z. Moyo and the Kalanga Cultural
Society’,AHN, 22 Dec. 1956, 12. His name means ‘Genuine Ndebele’. See also copies of
articles in BM, 16 July 1960, 15 June 1960, 9 April 1960, 2 July 1960, 16 Sept. 1961, 26
Mar. 1960, 7 May 1960, 16 June 1956, 23 May 1959; and in AHN, 11 May 1957.
69 AHN, 22 Dec. 1956.
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emphasizing a populist, counter-Ndebele narrative that stressed the
‘Maswina’ (Shona) origin of the Kalanga. To this eﬀort, some Ndebele re-
acted by giving an ‘Ndebelecized ’ version of the Kalanga past with a view to
countering this ‘rebel ’ history. Reporting one such Kalanga Society meeting
he attended, one Ndebele regional activist said:
At their meeting held last Sunday morning at the Stanley Hall strange things were
said against the Matabele speaking people. Some of the speakers went so far as to
say that the Kalanga were an oﬀshoot of the ‘Maswina’ and that therefore the
Kalanga and the ‘Maswina’ were one people. I was annoyed at some of the things
said there because being a Mndebele and knowing the truth about the history of
the Kalanga from my grandfather, I saw that the real object was to annoy me,
in particular, because it seems as if most of what was said there was directed to me.
I was also surprised to see present at this meeting Mr. Male, Mr. Lazarus Nkala
andMr. W. Ngwenya. When are these young men going to learn that the Matabele
and the Kalanga are one group, though they are divided into smaller unimportant
sections, namely Nguni, Sutu, Kalanga, Lilima, Nanzwa, BaNyai and so on the
same way as the ‘Maswina’ are divided into smaller sections such as the Karanga,
Mazezuru, Mahungwe, Manyika, Korekore, and so on. Is Mr. Moyo now going to
represent the Kalanga workers or all of us as he is doing? I suggest that Mr. Moyo
should resign at once.70
Kalanga critics also suggested that the headquarters of KCS should be
in Plumtree rather than Bulawayo and that Kalanga should stop teaching
their culture in a ‘foreign land’,71 conﬁrming their vision of Bulawayo as
an Ndebele space. Interestingly, the editors who queried Jason Moyo’s
nationalism because of his leadership of the Kalanga Society never queried
Joshua Nkomo’s nationalism, though he was a staunch member of the MHS.
Despite all this, Kalanga celebrated this ethnic activism as a breakthrough
against the inferiority complex created by Ndebele in the precolonial
period and perpetuated by current zansi chiefs, colonial administrators
and Ndebele cultural activists.72 Because eﬀorts to convince some Kalanga
to merge into a regional Ndebele network were not so successful, Ndebele–
Kalanga interactions remained loosely deﬁned, but competitive, until the
mid-1960s.
The situation was similar with the Shona in Bulawayo. They had been
active there before the 1920s and constituted a larger proportion of
Bulawayo’s early non-Matabeleland labourers.73 Although the Shona were
very inﬂuential and often held lucrative jobs, they were not well co-ordinated
and had no strong cultural society to represent their collective needs, es-
pecially before 1950. In the 1950s, the MHS was urging urban Ndebele to be
more assertive and to consider themselves as permanent urban dwellers with
property rights and security of tenure,74 something that was not the case
earlier. Responding to their internal division and to the rise of Ndebele re-
gional power, in 1952 the Shona formed a Sons of Mashonaland Cultural
Society (MCS), a rival movement to the MHS that existed, according to
70 Uqobo, ‘Letter to the Editor, Mr. J. Z. Moyo and the Kalanga Cultural Society’.
71 AHN, 20 Dec. 1956.
72 AHN, 5 Jan. 1957. Zansi are members of the Ndebele ruling aristocracy.
73 Msindo, ‘Ethnicity, not class?’ 74 BM, 25 Sept. 1954.
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Joseph Msika, ‘to interpret the soul of the Mashonas’,75 suggesting a revival
of Shona culture. The Shona leaders included men who became ‘nationalist
leaders’ such as Simon Mzenda, Joseph Msika, Clement Muchachi,76
and other members who were on the Bulawayo African Advisory Board,
including Patrick Rubatika, J. Vera, T. Z. Chigumira, James Chimsoro,
D. A. Masunda and many other Shona dignitaries. The 100 leaders who
gathered at their 1954 conference stressed the need to ‘appreciate all that is
noble in all that is Shona’ and spoke of the ‘necessity of developing latent
powers amongst the Mashona and the African people generally’.77 Their
preponderance in city politics must have been one of the manifestations of
their ‘ latent’ powers. The MCS, also known as the Monomotapa Oﬀspring
Society by 1957, was a brainchild of Shona elites, some of whom were
nationalists. By 1957, it boasted a regular membership of 300 people in
Bulawayo, and often generated resources by lending money to African
business people.78
Though African nationalists publicly denied ‘tribalism’, which they be-
lieved to be an unreasonable hatred of other ethnic groups, they were not
against ‘ethnicity’ which they christened a ‘healthy patriotism’ helping to
preserve ‘the bit that is left of our customs’,79 or saw as a ‘natural cultural
movement which had no quarrel with people of other ethnic groups’.80
One could double as an ethnic activist and a nationalist. The members of
the MHS considered both nationalism and the preservation of Ndebele
ethnicity equally important. Thus, it is understandable why, at the height of
nationalist unity in 1960, Stephen Nkomo, the chairperson of the Bulawayo
National Democratic Party (NDP – a successor to the ANC) and brother
to NDP President Joshua Nkomo, resigned from its leadership in favour
of the presidency of the MHS. Asked about his resignation in favour of
a ‘tribal society’, he asserted that he still believed in the philosophy and
policy of the NDP and that the MHS was not anti-nationalist, but simply
wanted to ‘foster and preserve the language, culture and traditions of the
Amandebele’.81 Inﬂuential Shona leaders in Bulawayo also believed in the
healthy co-existence of ethnic groups and nationalism. The early founders of
the MCS, although acclaimed nationalists, remained active members and
patrons of the Society. ThoughMsika was an executive member of the NDP,
he remained an active patron of the MCS. When he was released from pol-
itical detention in 1960, the Society quickly organized a welcome party for
him and other detainees, stressing that Msika needed a special reception as
he was the chairman of the MCS and would remain so since he was now
back.82 This co-existence of ethnic groups and nationalism also explains the
survival of the MHS and its insistence, as late as June 1963, that it would not
disband.83
75 BM, 24 May 1952. 76 AHN, 5 June 1954. 77 Ibid.
78 BCC, T. Box 101, S.0.8, Societies and Constitutions, Vol. 2: Secretary,
Monomotapa Oﬀspring Society to the Director of African Administration, 25 June 1957;
BCC, T. Box 101, S.0.8, vol. II : Constitution of theMonomotapa Oﬀspring Society, June
1957. This is a reproduced version of the MCS constitution in T. Box 101, S.0.8,
Constitution of the Shona Cultural Society, approved 9 Apr. 1956.
79 BM, 10 Mar. 1956. 80 BM, 18 June 1960. 81 BM, 18 June 1960.
82 BM, 18 June 1960, 10; AHN, 25 June 1960, 11. 83 AHN, 22 June 1963.
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Identifying with nationalism brought pride to certain ethnic groups
instead of threatening their sectarian interests. The Kalanga, for instance,
did not mind their ethnic identity co-existing with nationalism because
nationalism promoted a Kalanga public image. This ethnic attachment was
not necessarily political tribalism, but a yearning for recognition. Kalanga
intellectuals and ordinary people in Bulawayo, long desiring a more public
Kalanga space, found comfort in the fact that the top leaders of the NDP
(such as Nkomo, Moyo, Silundika and Lazarus Nkala) were Kalanga.
Nationalism therefore unwittingly complemented Kalanga ethnicity rather
than conﬂicting with it. Commenting on the election of three Kalanga men to
lead the NDP, Kalangas expressed their excitement in the Bantu Mirror.
This article, originally written in Kalanga reads:
This election makes us Kalanga very happy as these men were elected to lead this
party which has a membership of more than 100,000 people, most of whom are
Kalanga. The leader of the party Joshua Nkomo is currently in London. His
deputy, George Silundika, is a Kalanga from Nope. Another Kalanga man elected
is Mr. Jason Moyo from Maphaneni. Joshua Nkomo also comes from
Maphaneni.84
Despite this picture of nationalism and ethnicity complementing each
other, there were instances of conﬂict between these identities. A particularly
important instance was the debate around the naming of the imagined
nation, Zimbabwe. As Ndebele identity was becoming regionalized in the
1950s, members of this still-weak regional bloc began to lobby other
nationalists to recognize its memorial monuments. At a public meeting of the
NDP, one of its leaders suggested that the name of the country might change
to Zimbabwe when their party had subdued the colonial government.
Zimbabwe was a Shona name, derived from the Great Zimbabwe, an early
Shona state credited as the cradle of Shona civilization. The MHS, sus-
pecting Shona bias, condemned the suggestion as ‘promoting tribal feel-
ings’. Fearing for the diminution of the Matopos, an important Ndebele
monument, they instead advocated holding important political meetings in
the Matopo Hills, not at Great Zimbabwe, and proposed that the nation be
called Matopo. The Matopo Hills gloriﬁed a predominantly Ndebele and
Kalanga religious and political culture dating from the pre-colony. About
sixty years earlier, an indaba (political meeting) between Rhodes and
Ndebele leaders held in the Matopos had ended the 1896 wars.85 In the eyes
of the MHS, the Matopos saved the country. From the early 1950s, the
Matopos were no longer solely for local cultural societies. Bulawayo
nationalists made frequent visits to the hills to consult their gods about
the problems of their country.86 The area was a sacred monument. ‘The
Matopos’, explained Mbobo, ‘are both historically and traditionally of great
signiﬁcance and spiritual importance and attempts to belittle it would be
seriously resisted by all in Matabeleland’.87 The debate about the Matopos
84 BM, 5 Nov. 1960. 85 See Ranger, Voices from the Rocks, 3–5, 209–21.
86 Nkomo, Story of My Life, 13–15.
87 BM, 20 Aug. 1960. The debate about the Matopos came about during the
Constitutional talks of 1960, a time when opportunists in the NDP thought that the
transfer of power was imminent.
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in 1960 was therefore partly regionalist and partly nationalist. The advocates
of ‘Matopo’ were unsuccessful in their lobby, but the point had been made:
that nationalism had to treat regional identities with caution, in the interest
of nationalism. Had African political leaders addressed these concerns and
perhaps paciﬁed theMHS, the country’s fragile nationalismmight have been
strengthened.
NATIONALISM, THE AFRICAN ADVISORY BOARDS AND TENANTS’
ASSOCIATIONS, 1950–1963
In addition to ethnic associations, the politics of representation in urban
administration also provide insight into both ethnicity and nationalism. The
1929 ﬁghts between Shona and predominantly Ndebele people caught urban
administrators unawares and demonstrated the need to involve Africans in
urban administration. From this time the idea of having ‘Native Advisory
Boards’ was mooted. However, it was only with the enactment of the African
(Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act of 1946 that Urban
Councils were empowered to establish African Advisory Boards.88 This
legislation was imported from South Africa where it had been introduced
earlier.89 In practice, Bulawayo already had such boards, which were created
in 1940; but they only became eﬀective in the 1950s.90 Advisory Board
members acted as a link between Africans and the white councillors. While
Board members usually consulted the people and conveyed their wishes
to the councillors,91 they were also colonial mouthpieces, taking council
decisions to the Africans.
In the 1950s, Advisory Board membership was contested mainly amongst
African business and intellectual elites.92 As an emerging elite class, their
wealth and social exposure counted in securing the vote. However, sources
show clearly that election also depended heavily on ethnic loyalties, as groups
competed for control of social and political space in town.93 Of the Advisory
Board members whose two-year terms expired in December 1953, more
than half were Shona (D. K. Mzenda, J. B. Patsika, S. V. Mzenda, D. A.
Masunda and W. Ngwenya) and almost half were Kalanga (Amos Mazibisa,
Juba, Ndhlovu and Grey Bango), with one Fingo, Charleton Ngcebetsha.94
In response to this Shona domination, the usually pro-Ndebele newspaper,
the African Home News, conducted voter education, with the result that in
the 1953–4 Board elections, there were three new representatives from
Matabeleland. They were J. Z. Moyo (Kalanga) and Lazarus Nkala (KCS
member), who both became ZAPU nationalists, and another T. K. Mtiba.95
88 NAZ, S235/363, Urban Areas Act, 1934–5.
89 M.M. Ndubiwa, ‘African participation in housing management in Rhodesia : the
Bulawayo African Advisory Board’ (MSc. thesis, University of Birmingham, 1972),
6, 22. 90 Byo Ref. Lib., 33/2, City Of Bulawayo, Urban Aﬀairs Commission.
91 Interview with Mr. Douglas Ndiweni, Pelandaba Township, Bulawayo, 9 July 2003.
92 For their proﬁles, see BCC, A3.3, Members – General : Bulawayo African Advisory
Board, 1951.
93 William G. Flanagan, Urban Sociology: Images and Structure (2nd ed., Boston,
1995), 67–78, 171–3. 94 Msindo, ‘Kalanga–Ndebele relations’, 206–8. 95 Ibid. 206–8.
282 ENOCENT MSINDO
By 1957, the number of leaders from Matabeleland had increased, slowly
replacing some of the Shona. However, they were divided between Ndebele
and Kalanga.96 Explaining this increase recently, Makhoba Khulube, a
Kalanga activist and former Advisory Board member in the late 1950s said,
‘It had become a matter of voting for our own sons who understood our
culture and traditions. There were so many capable people of Shona origin
that we could not vote for because they did not represent Kalanga and
Ndebele interests’.97 Candidates had to make their ethnic positions clear or
risk losing elections.98Taking advantage of the division between Kalanga and
Ndebele, Shona Board members usually won the vote on crucial decisions.
This leverage gave them the latitude for corruption through their power to
recommend the issuing of loans and shop licences to upcoming Shona busi-
ness persons, promoting Shona names for popular streets in order to per-
petuate their history in Bulawayo and encouraging white councillors to
favour Shona housing applicants.99
Though most of the Advisory Board members were ethnic patriots, they
also had other broader experiences that made them well-rounded urbanites.
They served in various capacities as trade unionists, sports executives,
business directors, urban school teachers, Native Department clerks,
tenants’ association leaders and members of international Christian move-
ments. Some, such as Erick Tikili, were in touch with international
Communists.100 Their experiences gave them the liberty to use Boards as
political platforms to articulate urban African discontent before nationalist
parties were launched. Reﬂecting rising African political consciousness, they
debated and tried to agitate for the overturning of some Council regulations
such as the legislation against skokian (an African homebrewed alcoholic
drink) and discussed issues of public accountability in the City Council.101
They were therefore not solely on the Advisory Boards to serve sectional
96 AHN, 14 Dec. 1957.
97 Interview with Mr. Makhoba Khulube, Msiteli Township, Bulawayo, 30 June 2003.
98 AHN, 20 Feb. 1960.
99 Interview with Mr. Makhoba Khulube, Dombodema, Bulilima-Mangwe, 25 June
2003. Similar evidence came from an interview withMr. Hlangabeza Kumalo, Pelandaba,
Bulawayo, 9 July 2003; Brown Luza, ‘Matabeles should get more businesses than
Mashonas’, AHN, 18 Mar. 1959;AHN, 19 Dec. 1953; BM, 13 Jan. 1951.; BCC, T. Box
312, H2-2, Street and building names: Provincial Native Commissioner to the Director,
African Administration Department, 23 Nov. 1957; BCC, T. Box 343, A20.1, Minutes of
the Bulawayo African Township Advisory Board, 6 September 1951. See also E. Msindo,
‘Thoughts on ethnicity and nationalism in colonial urban areas: the experience of
Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, 1950s–1963’ (unpublished seminar paper, Rhodes University, 31
August 2005), 10.
100 BCC, A3, 3, Members – General, Bulawayo African Advisory Board: Information
regarding Advisory Board member Eric Tikili, 12 Oct. 1951. Tikili was in touch with
Communists from Oslo. Even Mzingeli, the trade unionist, also had marvellous docu-
ments showing connections with the international world. See Vambe, Rhodesia to
Zimbabwe, 104.
101 BCC, T. Box 135, A1, Advisory Board Policy: E. H. Ashton (Director of African
Administration) to the Returning Oﬃcer, 20 Dec. 1954; BCC, T. Box 135, A1, Extract
from the Director of African Administration’s report, December 1954; BCC, T. Box 136,
Correspondence: Minutes BAT, 1954: Note for ﬁle A3-6, 18 Aug. 1954.
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ethnic interests. P. J. Taylor, the Bulawayo Location Superintendent, was
not far from the truth when he remarked:
To a small, politically active, section of the urban population, the urban Adv.
Board [sic] has become recognised as a useful instrument, and one of considerable
prestige value: a Govt-sanctioned [sic] platform on which leaders, without undue
risk to themselves, can give a daring and spectacular performance as ‘rep-
resentatives’ of their people. And the Board is increasingly becoming a one-way
instrument of communication, a loudspeaker for militant Afr. [sic] leadership
aimed at governing authority. Even as such it has its uses, provided we are pre-
pared to see that, inspite of obvious abuses and irresponsibilities, the sentiments
voiced by this elected minority are shared, in a less articulate but nonetheless real
sense, shared by a very large number of people. In this sense and in this manner
they do, indeed, represent as well as create and stimulate mass opinion.102
With the rise of national political consciousness characteristic of the late
1950s, Advisory Board positions were politicized further, becoming theatres
from which enthusiastic African nationalists questioned colonial power and
lobbied for direct African representation in urban administration. Such
broadened agendas no longer required the candidates of those Boards to be
elected merely on the basis of ethnic aﬃliation. Barely a year after its for-
mation, the ANC ﬁelded candidates to contest the 1958 Bulawayo Advisory
Board elections. It garnered majority support, having ﬁelded among others
prominent members of its executive.103 This remained the general trend until
1964 when nationalists decided to boycott the Boards, opting for a more
confrontational approach.104 Colonial rulers were slow to realize the force of
African opinion in the late 1950s, and the extent to which these new poli-
ticians had inﬁltrated the Advisory Boards. The Native Department viewed
urban African politicians as unorganized ‘rabid, fanatical power-seeking’105
and ‘tub-thumping traders in politics …, hurling invectives and insults
against Europeans, … [and] issuing insults against any native who might take
a diﬀerent view’.106 However, belated admission by local colonial authorities
showed that the top colonial administrators were simply presenting oﬃcial
propaganda. Dr. Ashton, the Director of African Administration, made a
telling comment on the Advisory Board:
For the ﬁrst time, politics has entered local aﬀairs in that several NDP leaders
contested the Advisory Board with active Party support. About half of them were
successful. At ﬁrst they adopted an intransigent party line, impermeable to facts,
102 BCC, T. Box 135, A1, PNC Bulawayo, Draft : Liaison between urban Africans and
government, Jan. 1955.
103 BCC, A. A., Annual report of the Director of African Administration for the year
ended 30th June 1958.
104 For election results for the years until 1964, see AHN, 19 Dec. 1959; BCC, A.A.,
City of Bulawayo: Annual report of the Director of African Administration, 30 June
1960; Report of the Director of African Administration, 30 June 1961; Report of the
Director of African Administration, 30 June 1962; City of Bulawayo, Annual report of the
Director of Housing and Amenities, 30 June 1963.
105 Cory, P/68/1671, Report of the Secretary for Native Aﬀairs and Chief Native
Commissioner (CNC) for the Year 1960; P/68/16/1671, Report of the Secretary for
Native Aﬀairs and CNC for the year 1959.
106 Cory, P/69/1667, Report of the Secretary for Native Aﬀairs, CNC and Director of
Native Development for the Year 1957.
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but with experience and participation they gradually mellowed to a more con-
structive and practical approach.107
The election in June 1962, saw a return of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union,
whose leaders often played a prominent part in Board matters. At times, especially
just before the National Democratic Party was banned, discussions were inhibited
and decisions inﬂuenced by political consideration and fear.108
The debates held and recommendations made by the Boards between 1959
and 1964 show that African leaders never lost sight of their political mission.
In a Bulawayo African Township (Makokoba) Advisory Board meeting
dominated by leaders of the NDP such as Msika, Stephen Nkomo, Leonard
Nkala, Mrs. S. M. Lesabe and Mutuma, the Board recommended without
opposition that an NDP application for oﬃce space in Makokoba be
granted.109 A more serious debate by the Advisory Boards was about the use
of the Ikwezi Club. The idea of the Ikwezi Club came up when European
liquor was ﬁrst introduced to Africans. It was a brainchild of African middle-
class city dwellers who wanted ‘a quiet venue to drink and play games’.110
The debate underpinned conﬂicts between rising African bourgeois class
interests and popular nationalism whose support base was the African poor.
The club was built from public funds in the 1950s, but unfortunately the
constitution adopted by earlier Advisory Boards prohibited non-members
from entering the facilities. It was solely for rich Africans dressing ‘smart’.
Commoners and those of the middle class who failed to dress ‘respectably’
were not admitted. This exclusiveness became a source of conﬂict. One
informant who was blocked from entering the tavern told the author:
There was a year when I went to Ikwezi. On arrival, I was told to wear a tie and not
to carry a knobkerrie if I was to be allowed in. I never went back there again. They
wanted smart gentlemen. They thought that smartly dressed men were non-
violent, being gentlemen. But my view was that suits were unsuitable for beer
drinking. Suits were for weddings and special occasions. The people complained to
the Advisory Board and there the matter was solved. They ended up admitting
everyone into Ikwezi.111
The exclusive membership of Ikwezi opened critical debates for nation-
alists. Such debates reﬂected a range of dichotomies and conﬂicts: colonial
urban policies versus nationalism, middle-class elitism versus popular
‘communalist ’ nationalism, middle-class non-political elites versus middle-
class political elites, colonial ideologies of individual respectability and dig-
nity against the idea of public utility, and popular democracy versus private
claims. Nationalists on the Advisory Boards felt duty-bound to defend
their populist-oriented political consciences against other members of the
Advisory Board such as Hlabangana, Mathe, Sidindi and others who wanted
107 BCC, A. A., Report of the Director of African Administration for the year ending
30 June 1961.
108 BCC, A. A., Report of the Director of African Administration, 30 June 1962.
109 BCC, Tower Block, T. Box 343, A20.1, BCC, Minutes of the Bulawayo African
Township Advisory Board, Khami Road oﬃces, 14 April 1961 and 26 April 1961.
110 BCC, T. Box 343, A20.1, Minutes of the Meeting of the Joint Advisory Board held
in the Board Room, Khami Road, on Friday 30 Mar. 1962.
111 Interview with Mr. S. Ncube, Tshabalala, 2 July 2005.
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the Club to remain restrictive. With the coming of nationalists such as
Joseph Msika, Madlela, Mguni, Sihwa, Lazarus Nkala and others onto
the Boards, successful eﬀorts were made to overturn the Ikwezi Club
constitution. They argued that since the Club was built from public funds,
access must be open to all without regard to dress or social status.
Reinforcing a belief in popular rule characteristic of emerging nationalisms,
Msika told the Board how people had demonstrated against the operation
of the Club. As if to intimidate the advocates of the status quo, Msika warned
that if the people’s wishes were ignored, the elites would regret it.112
The threats made a strong impact since they were directed at middle-
class people who had just suﬀered severe attacks in the nationalist-
orchestrated zhii (violent political) riots of July 1960 in which they lost
property and income. Following their party line, and aware that matters
might end in the hands of nationalists outside the Board, Msika suggested
that decisions about the mode of behaviour in Ikwezi should be ‘left to the
leaders of the people’.113 Further evoking the politics of the public, Madlela
stated that ‘much talk about being decent or not’ (a European creation)
annoyed the African public and made them ‘think evil about the Ikwezi
Club’. He reiterated that unless Ikwezi accepted the African public, the Club
would remain a target of the people.114
The debate about Ikwezi was as sensitive to the nationalists as it was to
middle-class apolitical elites; but the politicians won the debate because of
their threats and numerical strength on the Joint Advisory Board. It is clear,
however, that nationalists did not want Ikwezi opened to the public simply
from democratic sentiment. Rather, they wanted to use the Club as a relaxed
venue to discuss politics.115 There was a popular belief that the Club was
built as a place to debate the political aﬀairs of the country, but because of
the restrictions imposed, it only beneﬁted parties whose constituencies did
not involve the majority of poor blacks.116 Nationalists also believed that
unrestricted access to Ikwezi would help their cause by reducing the divide
between the middle class and the urban poor. This, African political leaders
hoped, would create an undiﬀerentiated mass of people identifying with
nationalist politics.
From the start, the Advisory Board system was structured as a powerless
institution. These Boards could only make recommendations to the City
Council,117 which was not legally bound to accept them. As Africans became
more politically informed and restless, the Advisory Boards ceased to be
respected as platforms for expressing African opinion. From the early 1950s,
there was suspicion amongst some Africans that Advisory Boards were tools
to serve colonial interests. Because of this suspicion, Tenants’ or Residents’
Associations were born as alternative, unoﬃcial platforms to express African
112 BCC, Minutes of a Meeting of the Joint Advisory Board, 30 Oct. 1961.
113 BCC, Minutes of the Joint Advisory Board, 6 Nov. 1961.
114 BCC, Minutes of the Joint Advisory Board Meeting, Khami Road, 20 Nov. 1961
115 A view shared by Khulube. Interview with Makhoba Khulube, Dombodema, 25
June 2003.
116 BCC, Minutes of the Joint Advisory Board Meeting, 26 April 1961; Minutes of the
Joint Advisory Board, 20 Nov. 1961.
117 BCC, T. Box 155, A1-2, Administration of Urban African Aﬀairs – Policy: The
origin, appointment and function of native urban areas Advisory Boards, 3 June 1959.
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urban grievances. As early as 1951, one such association, the Barbourﬁelds
Tenants’ Association had already begun to trouble the Director of Native
Development for oﬃcial recognition and to question the legitimacy of the
Advisory Boards as representatives of urban Africans.118 The Bulawayo
administration refused to recognize its Constitution, fearing ‘the danger of
its developing political tendencies, particularly as a number of those as-
sociated with it already have political aﬃliations’.119 Some members of this
association, such as Simon Mzenda, Msika and Jason Moyo, became leading
nationalists. The Bulawayo African Township also had its Rent Payers’
Association, a very popular group that attracted huge crowds at its meet-
ings.120 The group criticized the Council’s failure to solve the urban accom-
modation crisis and contended that Advisory Boards were ‘never popular’ in
Bulawayo as their members were merely ‘Yes men’ of the Europeans.121 The
Board members were aware of their own limitations and often sought public
sympathy, explaining that their views were not being considered by the City
Council.122
The new Advisory Board members of the late 1950s and early 1960s,123
unlike their earlier non-political counterparts, were largely leaders of the
ANC, NDP and ZAPU with a sense of a wider political mission. They
wanted a share of power as city councillors in the African locations,124
perhaps as a pilot project to demonstrate the administrative capacity of
Africans. In this mission, they had the support of the Leaseholders
Associations, some of which directly petitioned the City Council to repeal
the Advisory Boards and replace them with elected African councillors.125
Fearing a possible take-over of Councils by nationalists, but at the same time
careful not to appear obdurate, colonial rulers suggested that Bulawayo
Africans be represented by a paltry four African councillors. This
recommendation, rejected by nationalists, triggered new debates about
democracy and African self-rule. Commenting on the proposal to have only
four African councillors, Jason Moyo, a ZAPU national committee member
and Advisory Board member, shouted that it was ‘thorough nonsense’. He
reasoned, ‘How can the people in the majority be represented by 4 and those
118 BCC, T. Box 153, S03, Residents’ associations, 1951–1955: S. V. Mzenda
(Secretary B. F. Tenants’ Association) to the Director of Native Administration
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Director’s Report, June 1951.
120 BCC, T. Box 153, S03, Report of the Meeting of the Rent Payers’ Association in
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121 BCC, T. Box 153, S03, Rent Payers’ Association Monthly Bulletin, 1 July 1953.
122 BCC, T. Box 136, Correspondence: Minutes BAT: Note for ﬁle, 18 Aug. 1954.
123 BCC, T. Box 237, Conﬁdential report of the Director of African Administration on
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in the minority by 16? The time [has] come for all people to be fully rep-
resented’. Quoting a number of African countries where the people were
‘fully represented’, he argued that Africans in Zimbabwe needed full
autonomy as the only way to prevent racial animosities.126 Clearly, the
Advisory Boards had become nationalists ’ political springboards.
Because of the intransigency of their colonial masters, the Advisory Boards
in Bulawayo adopted a policy of low-intensity resistance to the Council. This
included boycotting meetings, cancelling meetings for lack of a prepared
agenda and delaying bringing their recommendations to the Council, arguing
that they were taking matters back to ‘the people’.127 The Director of African
Administration thought that the tendency to defer to ‘the people’ was a
response to their fear of the increasingly popular Tenants Associations,
which he observed as having become ‘a feature of African political life in the
African townships’.128 This popular imagination of African power by the
nationalists and attempts to democratize a colonial institution (Advisory
Boards) was consistent with the politics of moderation and cooperation
adopted by African politicians before the 1963 ZAPU–ZANU split. Because
moderation did not work, African opinion turned against it and political
leaders began to withdraw from the Advisory Boards. What also annoyed the
Board members were attempts to have them endorse rent increases in 1964,
which they knew would make them more unpopular. Consequently, they
resigned in protest129 and campaigned for the boycott of the elections. This
stance led to the collapse of the Advisory Board system from 1964 to 1968,
when it slowly revived.130 With the temporary end of the Boards, coordinated
underground urban activism increased. Unlike the zhii riots of 1960,131
which targeted some African businessmen, perhaps for their political indif-
ference, this new political activism mainly involved organized political
sabotage. There were attempts to throw a grenade at the Prime Minister
Winston Field when he visited Bulawayo; to sabotage installations in
Bulawayo; to damage the shops and houses of perceived enemies of the
nationalist cause; to destroy beer gardens; and to boycott Council beer to
cripple the body’s ﬁnances. Political groups also staged rent boycotts, dam-
aged municipal water meters and withdrew children from urban schools in
protest at fee increases.132 In the minds of nationalists, local Council prob-
lems were part of broader national political problems. Unfortunately, con-
fronting colonial power directly became more diﬃcult as African leaders
126 BCC, T. Box 343, A.20, South West Commonage, Advisory Board – General :
Minutes of a Joint Board Meeting, 30 Feb. 1962. See also Daily News, 29 May 1962.
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continued their failure to unite. There was a split in 1963 leading to the
division of nationalist parties into ZAPU (People’s Caretaker Council) and
ZANU – a split, I have argued elsewhere, which had more to do with col-
onial harassment, personality diﬀerences and the struggle for power than
with ethnic diﬀerences.133 Political tribalism and regionalism only became an
issue after the division, as the separated leaders sought methods of gaining
membership. The split also must be understood in the broader context of
1963. With the collapse of the Federation, nationalists thought that the time
was ripe for independence, which led invariably to issues of the country’s
future leadership.
CONCLUSION
The case study of Bulawayo suggests that the rise of nationalism did not
necessarily require that ethnic groups be eradicated. Instead, it required that
the groups play a complementary role in the development of nationalism.
This article has demonstrated the ways in which this complementary re-
lationship was instantiated, in the nationalization of precolonial ethnic heroes
and in the commemoration of monuments such as the Great Zimbabwe and
of critical historical sites such as the Matopos. In the early 1950s ethnic
associations were beginning to operate as political forums for emerging
African leaders, and by the late 1950s most leaders of ethnic groups occupied
important positions in the successive nationalist parties, from the ANC
through the NDP to ZAPU. While they were not elected to such positions as
representatives of ethnic groups, the Kalanga case demonstrates that their
promotion to leadership in the nationalist cause did give members of their
ethnic group something to boast about – that nationalism had made them
more visible.
Ethnic groups in Bulawayo did not create narrow-minded urban citizens,
however, but left their members room to be cosmopolitan. Whilst ethnic
identity was undoubtedly important in the early 1950s and beyond, most
of the leaders of these associations were linked to various other non-ethnic
identities, giving them exposure outside their particular groups. Thus,
nationalists like Mzenda, Msika, Nkomo, Lazarus Nkala and Jason Moyo,
apart from being staunch ethnic patriots, were both renowned trade union-
ists and leaders of prominent tenant associations. It is no wonder that, as
nationalist identities intensiﬁed in the city, ethnic identity remained im-
portant and ethnic groups vowed not to disband. By depicting these groups
as cultural societies with no political interest, nationalism could not render
ethnicity irrelevant, but promoted it instead for the beneﬁt that ethnic-based
cultures oﬀered to nationalism.
Although Africans had only vague ideas of nationalism in the early 1950s,
they understood colonial subjugation, which made them a collective op-
pressed ‘other’. The denial of political power to African elites made some of
them identify with the masses, thus undermining colonial eﬀorts at dividing
and ruling. From 1957, as African political leaders made inroads on the
urban Advisory Boards, these Boards, together with tenants associations,
became political platforms to lobby for African representation in urban
133 Msindo, ‘Kalanga–Ndebele relations’, 241–7.
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administration. The failure of this project led to a boycott of the Boards and
the beginning of the politics of sabotage and violent political confrontation.
The Advisory Board experience nonetheless showed the organizational
power of the African nationalists.
Up to 1963, the relationship between ethnicity and nationalism was gen-
erally cordial. It only deteriorated after the split that saw the emergence of
ZANU as a rebel movement. We have maintained that the split itself was not
caused by ethnic enmity, contrary to those scholars who thought that eth-
nicity and nationalism were always opposite identities.134 Animosity between
ethnic groups emerged well after the split as the two movements, ZANU and
ZAPU, sought to build their bases of support.
134 Sithole, Struggles within the Struggle, 44–56.
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